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The study of active lying poses consider-
able methodological challenges, especially
regarding suitable experimental designs
to prompt dishonest responses. This aim
is often achieved by instructing partic-
ipants whether to lie or to be honest
in a given situation (e.g., Spence et al.,
2001; Walczyk et al., 2003). Shalvi and col-
leagues have recently promoted a striking
alternative approach which allows study-
ing spontaneous lies: the die under cup
paradigm (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2012; cf.
Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008). In this
paradigm, participants roll a die, report
the outcome anonymously, and receive
payment depending on their roll. Though
it is not possible to determine whether a
given participant is lying or not, the distri-
bution of outcomes indicates whether par-
ticipants tend to report higher numbers
than expected by chance.
Shalvi et al. (2012) modified this
paradigm to investigate situational deter-
minants of self-serving lies. In their
Experiment 1, participants were to roll a
die three times and to report the outcome
of the first roll afterward. Importantly,
they either worked at their own pace or
had to complete the three rolls within
20 s (to induce time pressure). Participants
were more honest in the self-paced condi-
tion than in the time pressure condition,
which led the authors to suggest that lying
is an initial, automatic tendency that is
overcome only if sufficient time to delib-
erate is available and if unethical behavior
cannot be justified.
These conclusions are surprising
because a substantial body of research
seems to suggest the very opposite:
numerous studies found lying to be cog-
nitively more demanding than responding
honestly and, consequently, honesty is
typically seen as a behavioral default (e.g.,
Spence et al., 2001, 2004; Walczyk et al.,
2003, 2009; Debey et al., 2012). Further
supporting this view, honest answers
seem to be actively inhibited during lying
(Spence et al., 2001; Nuñez et al., 2005).
These findings challenge the interpre-
tations of Shalvi et al. (2012), and we
propose that certain peculiarities of the
die under cup paradigm are responsible
for the diverging results.
As a central feature of the die under
cup paradigm, participants can—in
principle—generate their response before
actually rolling the die. This procedure is
markedly different from other approaches
where an answer’s appropriateness and
truthfulness depend on the specific ques-
tion that is asked in a trial (e.g., Spence
et al., 2001). Here, the answer can be gen-
erated only after the question is asked.
These latter designs might thus be bet-
ter suited to address the automaticity of
lying because they tap directly onto the
time it takes to generate dishonest and
truthful responses. The die under cup
paradigm, however, can be modified to
address automaticity more directly as well.
Accordingly, we varied the time avail-
able for reflection about the (dis)honesty
of the reports on two levels: individual
die rolls and blocks of rolls. The avail-
able time between individual die rolls and
reports was manipulated by asking partici-
pants either to report the number immedi-
ately (immediate report condition) or after
a short delay (delayed report condition).
This delay was implemented by asking par-
ticipants to report only after continuing
to shake the cup (Figure 1A). The time
available at the level of blocks of rolls
was manipulated by having participants
run through each condition not only once
but repeatedly before and after a short
break. Each of these rolls is statistically
independent of preceding and subsequent
tosses, and hence has always the same
expected value. Consequently, any above
chance variation of reported numbers over
time (i.e., before and after the break) must
originate from the human observer. Thus,
assessing the time course of reported out-
comes provides a novel measure of dishon-
esty in addition to the mean outcome that
has been used previously.
Thirty-two participants (mean age:
24.9 years) joined the game and were
informed that they could earn up to 2.50C
depending on the total of 12 rolls with an
eight-sided die. They started either with
the immediate report condition or the
delayed report condition (three rolls) and
continued with the remaining condition
(three rolls). Crucially, this sequence was
repeated after a short break. We had to
discard the data of four participants due
to procedural errors, leaving data of 28×
12 = 336 rolls.
Participants reported higher numbers
in the delayed report condition than in
the immediate report condition in the first
experimental half, but not in the second
half (see Figure 1B). This observation was
confirmed by a 2× 2 repeated-measures
analysis of variance with the factors con-
dition (immediate vs. delayed report) and
experimental half (1st vs. 2nd) that was
run on the mean outcomes. Most notably,
the interaction of condition and experi-
mental half was significant, F(1, 27) = 4.96,
p = 0.034, η2p = 0.16, whereas neither
main effect approached significance; con-
dition: F(1, 27) = 2.20, p = 0.149, η2p =
0.08; experimental half: F < 1. Tested sep-
arately, only the mean outcome of the
delayed report condition in the first half
differed from chance level (4.5), t(27) =
2.28, p = 0.031, d = 0.43.
These results challenge the interpreta-
tions of Shalvi et al. (2012) and suggest
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FIGURE 1 | Design and results. (A) Procedure of the immediate (top) and the
delayed report condition (bottom); the experimenter announced the current
condition, and participants reported the outcomeof three rolls of an eight-sided
die. Both conditionswere repeated after a short break. (B) In the first half of the
experiment, participants reported higher outcomes in the delayed report
condition than in the immediate report condition, whereas the conditions did
not differ in the second half. Error bars represent standard errors for paired
differences, computed separately for each half (Pfister and Janczyk, 2013).
spontaneous responses to be quite hon-
est whereas only delayed responses fos-
ter self-serving behavior. On a larger
timescale, however, time for reasoning
(after the first experimental half) seems
to counteract dishonest responses again.
Thus, dishonest responses do not seem
to be a truly automatic tendency but
rather do they take more time and cog-
nitive effort than truthful responses. In
the light of previous research on lying
(Spence et al., 2001; Walczyk et al., 2003)
and on spontaneous tendencies to co-
operate rather than compete with oth-
ers (Rand et al., 2012), we thus believe
that lying is currently best be seen not
as “a dark side of human automatic ten-
dencies” (Shalvi et al., 2012, p. 1269)
but rather as the dark side of human
deliberation.
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